Governor Hogan recently announced a $9 Billion proposal to widen three major Maryland expressways using future toll revenue from "express toll lanes". This merely hints at the vast potential of highway tolls to raise prodigious amounts of money to build transportation projects. In this case, it is promised to be entirely at the risk of the private sector from design to construction to operation.
While this concept is only applied here to suburban highway widening, it really has much greater potential for financing a far wider range of transportation modes and projects in a much larger multi-state area - the entire Northeast U.S. Corridor.
The scope of the Hogan plan should be greatly expanded to become a public-private authority, all the way from Washington to New York or beyond, encompassing all major transportation facilities including highways, freight and passenger railroads and even future high-speed high-tech maglev or hyperloop. Narrow thinking focused only on specific widening for "express toll lanes" to reduce congestion subverts the entire concept.
The Maryland proposal is a way to address the specific growing highway congestion in the growing Washington, DC suburbs, while using the congestion to create the revenue source - so-called "congestion pricing". Tolls would be charged on designated "express toll lanes" and would rise as demand and congestion rises, being higher in peak than non-peak periods. Rising tolls would be a demand management tool to prevent the overuse of the toll lanes, much as hotels and airlines commonly charge higher rates for peak periods. Adjacent lanes would remain free. All motorists would benefit because the toll lanes would siphon traffic off of the free lanes, and those with flexible schedules would benefit even more from travelling at off-peak times.
But the basic problem of this concept is the same as its advantage - it feeds on congestion. Without congestion, it won't work. And the more congestion there is, the better it works. Congestion itself also reduces traffic capacity. So saying its goal is to reduce congestion is highly deceptive.
This is further confused by the fact that it's a highway building and widening scheme, and it touts expanding highways as a way to reduce congestion. So the very act of expanding highways works against the concept of "congestion pricing".
Moreover, widening specific highway segments creates capacity mismatches. The benefit ends where the highway widening ends. Bottlenecks merely move to these locations, thus nullifying the benefits.
These problems have been well illustrated in the billion dollar project to reconstruct seven miles of Interstate 95 several years ago from near the east Baltimore City line to White Marsh (MD 43) in order to provide four new "express toll lanes". Expansion of the highway from 8 to 12 lanes has indeed reduced congestion for everyone. As a result, there has been scant incentive to use the toll lanes, and they have only attracted an average volume of about 25,000 vehicles per day. This is an extremely low volume for a billion dollar project, more akin to what is carried by an urban arterial street. This entire segment of I-95 carries over 180,000 vehicles per day.
What's more, the "express lanes" must merge back into the old highway at each end. At the southwest end in Baltimore, this means going through the two tunnels under the harbor, neither of which is likely to be widened or expanded in anyone's lifetime despite constant traffic growth. (Right now, the city is attempting get funding to build new ramps into Port Covington which would allocate more of the I-95 capacity to new local traffic at the expense of through traffic.)
At the other end northeast of White Marsh, the problem is even more imminent. The two northeastbound express lanes themselves neck down to a single lane prior to merging back into old I-95. The entire northeastbound capacity goes from six lanes on the new express section, to four and then three lanes to the north. This creates a major bottleneck where congestion will continue to get worse, largely nullifying the whole benefit of the billion dollar project. Even many drivers who would enjoy the benefits of the express toll lanes avoid them because of the risk of getting trapped behind a slow poke when merging back at the end. They'd rather have the flexibility and freedom to weave around in the four free lanes.
The only "solution" to these problems is to sacrifice the free lanes, and make them work even worse, so that the toll lanes can attract an optimum level of traffic to maximize revenue.
In the Washington suburbs, the variable electronic toll InterCounty Connector (MD 200) was built as an "outer beltway" to solve the congestion problem on the old inner beltway (I-495), but of course it didn't. Now the inner beltway is one of the highways in the state's $9 billion package of three highways to be expanded for express toll lanes. It's the same old futile story of trying to widen our way out of traffic congestion.
The real solution has been on the horizon for a few years but has yet to see a breakthrough to a wide application: ALL major urban and interurban highways should be subject to congestion toll pricing, not just a few selected express lanes.
Collecting tolls through the EZ Pass and other electronic systems is now commonplace. It needs to move toward becoming universal. That is the only way that effective management of traffic demand can happen amid the highway system's many capacity constraints and bottlenecks. Highways should cost more to use in peak than off-peak periods, in order to regulate demand and eliminate congestion.
Uncongested highways could be free at off-peaks, including bridges and tunnels that now have a uniform toll 24 hours a day. Current gas taxes could even be rolled over into this system to further increase the incentive to use uncongested roads. The currently common political stalemate over raising gas taxes relates to the mistrust that this money is not truly a "user fee". This will allow motorists to have greater control over how much they pay for what they get. It could also make the currently contentious concept of a "carbon tax" more politically palatable.
Some enlightened experts have even proposed including auto insurance in the deal, so people could pay as they drive instead of getting an uncorrelated lump sum monthly or annual bill. All this would give motorists the maximum incentive to take control of their driving expenses (a nonstop version of Progressive Flo's "name your own price" tool).
All this could be done in phases, of course. In Maryland, it would begin by making all bridge and tunnel tolls variable based on peak demand. This could start off as "revenue neutral". The bridges and tunnels could be free in the middle of the night and cost more in rush hours.
Tolls for the I-95/895 harbor tunnels in Baltimore and the I-95 Susquehanna River bridge to the northeast, where congestion is a major problem, could be "bundled" with the existing express toll lanes in between to encourage more than the current 25,000 cars per day to use them.
Then instead of Hogan's plan to build new lanes for express toll traffic at a cost of billions, existing lanes could be converted to variable express toll lanes where congestion is already a problem. This could start simply with the conversion of one of the two "tubes" in each direction of the I-95 Fort McHenry Tunnel to variable tolls.
While this concept is only applied here to suburban highway widening, it really has much greater potential for financing a far wider range of transportation modes and projects in a much larger multi-state area - the entire Northeast U.S. Corridor.
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| Interstate 95 construction about a decade ago to create four "express toll" lanes, just northeast of the Baltimore Beltway (I-695) |
The scope of the Hogan plan should be greatly expanded to become a public-private authority, all the way from Washington to New York or beyond, encompassing all major transportation facilities including highways, freight and passenger railroads and even future high-speed high-tech maglev or hyperloop. Narrow thinking focused only on specific widening for "express toll lanes" to reduce congestion subverts the entire concept.
The basic "express toll lane" dilemma
The Maryland proposal is a way to address the specific growing highway congestion in the growing Washington, DC suburbs, while using the congestion to create the revenue source - so-called "congestion pricing". Tolls would be charged on designated "express toll lanes" and would rise as demand and congestion rises, being higher in peak than non-peak periods. Rising tolls would be a demand management tool to prevent the overuse of the toll lanes, much as hotels and airlines commonly charge higher rates for peak periods. Adjacent lanes would remain free. All motorists would benefit because the toll lanes would siphon traffic off of the free lanes, and those with flexible schedules would benefit even more from travelling at off-peak times.
But the basic problem of this concept is the same as its advantage - it feeds on congestion. Without congestion, it won't work. And the more congestion there is, the better it works. Congestion itself also reduces traffic capacity. So saying its goal is to reduce congestion is highly deceptive.
This is further confused by the fact that it's a highway building and widening scheme, and it touts expanding highways as a way to reduce congestion. So the very act of expanding highways works against the concept of "congestion pricing".
Moreover, widening specific highway segments creates capacity mismatches. The benefit ends where the highway widening ends. Bottlenecks merely move to these locations, thus nullifying the benefits.
These problems have been well illustrated in the billion dollar project to reconstruct seven miles of Interstate 95 several years ago from near the east Baltimore City line to White Marsh (MD 43) in order to provide four new "express toll lanes". Expansion of the highway from 8 to 12 lanes has indeed reduced congestion for everyone. As a result, there has been scant incentive to use the toll lanes, and they have only attracted an average volume of about 25,000 vehicles per day. This is an extremely low volume for a billion dollar project, more akin to what is carried by an urban arterial street. This entire segment of I-95 carries over 180,000 vehicles per day.
What's more, the "express lanes" must merge back into the old highway at each end. At the southwest end in Baltimore, this means going through the two tunnels under the harbor, neither of which is likely to be widened or expanded in anyone's lifetime despite constant traffic growth. (Right now, the city is attempting get funding to build new ramps into Port Covington which would allocate more of the I-95 capacity to new local traffic at the expense of through traffic.)
At the other end northeast of White Marsh, the problem is even more imminent. The two northeastbound express lanes themselves neck down to a single lane prior to merging back into old I-95. The entire northeastbound capacity goes from six lanes on the new express section, to four and then three lanes to the north. This creates a major bottleneck where congestion will continue to get worse, largely nullifying the whole benefit of the billion dollar project. Even many drivers who would enjoy the benefits of the express toll lanes avoid them because of the risk of getting trapped behind a slow poke when merging back at the end. They'd rather have the flexibility and freedom to weave around in the four free lanes.
The only "solution" to these problems is to sacrifice the free lanes, and make them work even worse, so that the toll lanes can attract an optimum level of traffic to maximize revenue.
In the Washington suburbs, the variable electronic toll InterCounty Connector (MD 200) was built as an "outer beltway" to solve the congestion problem on the old inner beltway (I-495), but of course it didn't. Now the inner beltway is one of the highways in the state's $9 billion package of three highways to be expanded for express toll lanes. It's the same old futile story of trying to widen our way out of traffic congestion.
The real solution begins by thinking bigger about EZ Pass
The real solution has been on the horizon for a few years but has yet to see a breakthrough to a wide application: ALL major urban and interurban highways should be subject to congestion toll pricing, not just a few selected express lanes.
Collecting tolls through the EZ Pass and other electronic systems is now commonplace. It needs to move toward becoming universal. That is the only way that effective management of traffic demand can happen amid the highway system's many capacity constraints and bottlenecks. Highways should cost more to use in peak than off-peak periods, in order to regulate demand and eliminate congestion.
Uncongested highways could be free at off-peaks, including bridges and tunnels that now have a uniform toll 24 hours a day. Current gas taxes could even be rolled over into this system to further increase the incentive to use uncongested roads. The currently common political stalemate over raising gas taxes relates to the mistrust that this money is not truly a "user fee". This will allow motorists to have greater control over how much they pay for what they get. It could also make the currently contentious concept of a "carbon tax" more politically palatable.
Some enlightened experts have even proposed including auto insurance in the deal, so people could pay as they drive instead of getting an uncorrelated lump sum monthly or annual bill. All this would give motorists the maximum incentive to take control of their driving expenses (a nonstop version of Progressive Flo's "name your own price" tool).
All this could be done in phases, of course. In Maryland, it would begin by making all bridge and tunnel tolls variable based on peak demand. This could start off as "revenue neutral". The bridges and tunnels could be free in the middle of the night and cost more in rush hours.
Tolls for the I-95/895 harbor tunnels in Baltimore and the I-95 Susquehanna River bridge to the northeast, where congestion is a major problem, could be "bundled" with the existing express toll lanes in between to encourage more than the current 25,000 cars per day to use them.
Then instead of Hogan's plan to build new lanes for express toll traffic at a cost of billions, existing lanes could be converted to variable express toll lanes where congestion is already a problem. This could start simply with the conversion of one of the two "tubes" in each direction of the I-95 Fort McHenry Tunnel to variable tolls.
Thinking bigger means thinking multi-modal
Of course, no congestion reduction plan can get far enough without getting a significant number of people out of their cars altogether. The solution strategy raised above therefore needs to incorporate multi-modalism - transit for people and freight rail for truck traffic.
Here the rule is simple: Spend money on transportation projects which will do the most good. New express toll lanes may fit a paradigm where tolls pay for the highway construction, but do they actually solve the problems? As discussed above, the answer is usually "no".
Thus we need to expand our horizons to where the revenue from highway tolls can be spent on high speed rail, freight rail and/or whatever is most beneficial. Expanding our horizons also means considering the entire highly urban and interrelated Northeast U.S. Corridor from Washington D.C. to New York or perhaps from Virginia to Boston or whatever works best. It also means involving the private sector, which should have the expertise and entrepreneurial discipline to make it work.
Defining boundaries and parameters in a logical, efficient, focused and non-arbitrary way is critical. Amtrak's dense Northeast Corridor service now competes for federal subsidies with sparse service in the great plains and mountain states, and very arguably comes out on the losing end. President Obama made a big deal of his "high speed rail" investment stimulus program, but spread the money out thinly to include any state that showed sufficient interest. President Trump has made highly publicized gestures to the private sector, but nothing yet that looks substantial.
There is a massive amount of money at stake in all this. Amtrak alone has plans for well over a hundred billion dollars worth of projects in the Northeast Corridor. Maglev and Hyperloop high speed rail projects are in a similar astronomical cost neighborhood, and really aren't redundant with Amtrak. Then there's countless major highway projects and various freight improvements and maintenance costs for all of it.
The biggest current rail project in the Northeast Corridor is a proposed new tunnel under the Hudson River from New Jersey to Manhattan, and its status has been tenuous. The project was originally led by the State of New Jersey and there was much contention and finger pointing when they decided it was too big for them. But it was revived by Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration with the various New York and New Jersey agencies in subordinate roles, and it hopefully now has enough momentum to actually happen.
Meanwhile, here in Maryland, Governor Hogan has gotten flack for his highly publicized interest in the private sector's maglev and hyperloop high speed rail proposals between Baltimore and Washington. And very recently, CSX Transportation pulled out of a deal with the State of Maryland and a hypothetical federal government partner to expand its railroad tunnel through downtown Baltimore to accommodate "double stack" freight trains, dealing a blow to the city, state and regional freight and port interests.
The common denominator is money.
The transportation needs of the Northeast Corridor from Washington to New York and beyond are bigger than any and all current entities can handle, even the United States government. The current complex interactive web of institutions at the federal, state, regional, municipal, and private sector levels lack the formal relationships and financial leverage to make it work.
The ultimate solution is the creation of a Northeast Corridor Transportation Authority that incorporates all the major highways and railroads in the entire multi-state region. This would include Amtrak and the various commuter railroad lines that run on the same tracks - including MARC, SEPTA, NJT, etc. NECTA would have the power to establish and regulate tolls on all its highways and set fares on all the rail lines. It would also contract with the private sector on various projects.
NECTA would also be the right kind of institution to implement the kind of "express toll" highway plan that could really reduce congestion, expand true effective daily traffic capacity, and give people control over their transportation expenses - and finance mobility solutions that would really work.
Here the rule is simple: Spend money on transportation projects which will do the most good. New express toll lanes may fit a paradigm where tolls pay for the highway construction, but do they actually solve the problems? As discussed above, the answer is usually "no".
Thus we need to expand our horizons to where the revenue from highway tolls can be spent on high speed rail, freight rail and/or whatever is most beneficial. Expanding our horizons also means considering the entire highly urban and interrelated Northeast U.S. Corridor from Washington D.C. to New York or perhaps from Virginia to Boston or whatever works best. It also means involving the private sector, which should have the expertise and entrepreneurial discipline to make it work.
Defining boundaries and parameters in a logical, efficient, focused and non-arbitrary way is critical. Amtrak's dense Northeast Corridor service now competes for federal subsidies with sparse service in the great plains and mountain states, and very arguably comes out on the losing end. President Obama made a big deal of his "high speed rail" investment stimulus program, but spread the money out thinly to include any state that showed sufficient interest. President Trump has made highly publicized gestures to the private sector, but nothing yet that looks substantial.
There is a massive amount of money at stake in all this. Amtrak alone has plans for well over a hundred billion dollars worth of projects in the Northeast Corridor. Maglev and Hyperloop high speed rail projects are in a similar astronomical cost neighborhood, and really aren't redundant with Amtrak. Then there's countless major highway projects and various freight improvements and maintenance costs for all of it.
The biggest current rail project in the Northeast Corridor is a proposed new tunnel under the Hudson River from New Jersey to Manhattan, and its status has been tenuous. The project was originally led by the State of New Jersey and there was much contention and finger pointing when they decided it was too big for them. But it was revived by Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration with the various New York and New Jersey agencies in subordinate roles, and it hopefully now has enough momentum to actually happen.
Meanwhile, here in Maryland, Governor Hogan has gotten flack for his highly publicized interest in the private sector's maglev and hyperloop high speed rail proposals between Baltimore and Washington. And very recently, CSX Transportation pulled out of a deal with the State of Maryland and a hypothetical federal government partner to expand its railroad tunnel through downtown Baltimore to accommodate "double stack" freight trains, dealing a blow to the city, state and regional freight and port interests.
The common denominator is money.
NECTA: Northeast Corridor Transportation Authority
The transportation needs of the Northeast Corridor from Washington to New York and beyond are bigger than any and all current entities can handle, even the United States government. The current complex interactive web of institutions at the federal, state, regional, municipal, and private sector levels lack the formal relationships and financial leverage to make it work.
The ultimate solution is the creation of a Northeast Corridor Transportation Authority that incorporates all the major highways and railroads in the entire multi-state region. This would include Amtrak and the various commuter railroad lines that run on the same tracks - including MARC, SEPTA, NJT, etc. NECTA would have the power to establish and regulate tolls on all its highways and set fares on all the rail lines. It would also contract with the private sector on various projects.
NECTA would also be the right kind of institution to implement the kind of "express toll" highway plan that could really reduce congestion, expand true effective daily traffic capacity, and give people control over their transportation expenses - and finance mobility solutions that would really work.
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