How to sort out the bus system: A "Circulator District"

The biggest "X Factor" in Governor Hogan's new proposed bus plan is the system's relationship to the circulator routes run by the city and others. And that's exactly how it should be.

The new MTA plan has a void in the city center. This calls for a completely different kind of planning and involvement by the various stakeholders, and recognition of the need for a whole new geographic entity - a "Circulator District".

Eliminating Redundancy

The MTA's new bus plan clearly recognizes that they should not continue flooding the congested downtown streets with slow inefficient long distance bus routes which are redundant to the city's "Charm City Circulator" system.

Operating short localized bus routes is a totally different proposition from the types of lengthy bus routes the MTA traditionally runs. The MTA has had decades of experience attempting to plan and operate short circulator routes, most of which have been failures.

While it's hard to say how much the MTA's failure with circulators differs from their overall track record of general failures at running any kind of bus service, what has happened fairly recently is that other institutions have taken up the mantle of operating circulators with greater success. This includes the city government's "Charm City Circulator" system along with various other institutions such as colleges and hospitals,

And in the blueprint for its new plan, the MTA has actually recognized the need to provide funding support for the Charm City Circulator, which the perpetually cash-strapped city has been struggling to pay for. While the MTA has long subsidized and contracted out services outside their traditional service area, such as for the DC suburbs, long distance commuter lines, small towns and rural areas, supporting service inside their core service area is new.

In fact, previous MTA attempts to run circulators have scrupulously avoided anything that would impact their own existing routes. The MTA's failed attempts to plan circulators in east and south Baltimore back in the 1990s even avoided running into downtown, just so the MTA would avoid competing with itself.

However, one of the apparent keys to the success of the Charm City Circulator is that it is very blatantly redundant with the MTA system - redundant but better. Being free helps too, of course, while the MTA system charges the same $1.70 "base fare" whether riding one mile or twenty.

The New MTA Inner City Plan

The new MTA plan calls for only seven "BaltimoreLink" bus routes to penetrate the heart of downtown, defined as the area bounded by Howard Street on the west, Franklin Street on the north, President Street on the east and Pratt Street on the south. (Five other major color keyed "Link" bus lines would not enter this central area at all.)

These are:

Blue - West: From US 40 (Edmondson Ave.) to East Baltimore Street
Red - North: From York Road/Charles/St. Paul
Green - Northeast: From Harford Road
Brown - Northeast: From Belair Road
Orange - East: From US 40 (Orleans Street)
Navy - Southeast: From Boston Street
Silver - South: From Key Highway/Hanover Street

Many corridor bus routes in the MTA system would no longer penetrate the center of downtown at all. These include from Washington Blvd, Wilkens Avenue, and Frederick Avenue to the southwest; Pennsylvania Avenue and Eutaw Street to the northwest; Howard Street and Greenmount Avenue to the north; and Eastern Avenue and Fayette Street to the east.

This group includes some notoriously bad bus lines, so if there's a better way, good riddance!

The new MTA plan recognizes that the center of downtown can get very slow, bogged down and congested. Still, it's a popular destination and since so many bus lines converge there, it has always been important for transfers.

There are three general ways to fill this void created by the diversion of traditional radial corridor bus lines away from the center city:

1 - Transfers to the Metro and Light Rail Lines - This is the ideal method. The Baltimore Metro, in particular is by far the fastest, highest capacity and most cost effective way to carry the most passengers. And the central light rail line has its place as well. It can provide very high capacity by using three car trains and not devoting too much service to its outer extremities.

2 - Express Commuter Bus Lines - These can get expensive for the amount of service provided, but they have a role as the MTA has shown. Their main distinguishing characteristics are a limited number of runs, infrequent or no off-peak service, and a lack of integration with the rest of the system, so we need not discuss them here.

3 - Circulator Bus Lines - Clearly, these must now have a greater role than ever. For shorter service on local inner city streets, slower and more circuitous routes are less of a problem than they are for longer distance bus lines.

A Proposed "Circulator Transit District" and Transit Hubs

The best way to fill the inner city void of the new MTA bus plan is to designate a "Circulator District" where short localized bus lines provide the bulk of all transit service.

Below is a map of a possible Circulator Transit District, based not on politics, but on physical and transit system geography. The key to its success is the location and operation of transit transfer hubs at its outer boundaries where the circulator bus lines would interface with the longer distance MTA bus lines and the regional rail system.

Proposed "Circulator District" and Transit Hubs to interface with the larger MTA system,
including the Metro (Green) and Light Rail (Blue).

The transit hubs need to be well located to facilitate transfers that encourage the greatest use of the most efficient transit services. Too many transit hubs would spread the transfers out too much, so that there wouldn't be enough of them at a given point. For example, Penn-North should not be encouraged as a transit hub because it would take away from the interface at nearby Mondawmin. Also, Penn Station does not make a good bus hub because it is along a corridor rather than at a transition point.

In fact, the Mondawmin Metro Station (shown below) is the prototype for what an efficient transit hub can be, linking bus lines from a wide arc, not only with the Metro which provides by far the fastest and best service, but with each of the other bus lines. Transfer options increase exponentially as the number of bus lines increase.

The Mondawmin hub is a nearly ideal off-street setting for all this, unlike many transit hubs envisioned either on-street or cramped into very small sites.

Mondawmin Metro Transit Hub: The best in the system by far.

The transit hubs envisioned for the periphery of this Circulator District are:

1 - Mondawmin Metro Station - The ideal setting (existing). An example of the kind of Circulator service that would be provided here is described in this post - splitting up the MTA #1 bus line into smaller localized routes including linking Mondawmin to Sandtown, Harlem Park and West Baltimore.

2 - West MARC Station - Sitting at the outer end of the "Highway to Nowhere" where efficient service to downtown can be provided, along with rail service to Washington, DC of course.

3 - Patapsco Light Rail Station - A very quick ride to downtown (existing).

4 - Baltimore Travel Plaza - Former Greyhound Bus Station, with very quick service to downtown via the I-95 Fort McHenry Tunnel (should have designated express lanes!)

5 - Hopkins Hospital Metro Station - This is the only hub which is not located on the periphery of the Circulator District. However, it is important to have a hub at the end of the Metro - all major modern urban transit lines need one! This would provide an east-side mirror image of the bus services provided at Mondawmin for the west-side. However, this is not an idea location, which is why an east/northeast Metro extension beyond Hopkins Hospital needs to be a high priority.

6 - Northwood Shopping Center - Now incorporated into the Morgan State University campus, this is a nearly ideal location for a transit hub. Travel time for thru service to to downtown can be improved significantly by using Loch Raven Boulevard instead of the existing routes via Waverly and Charles Village.

7 - Woodberry Light Rail Station - This station is located along the outer edge of higher density urban development, and so makes a good transit hub. (The Cold Spring Lane light rail station is also a possibility.)

In addition, a central transit hub should be provided at the Lexington Market Metro Station, as described in a previous post.

Organizing the System

It is not clear that the MTA plan provides the right amount of each kind of transit service, but it is a first step in that direction. The Circulator District and Transit Hubs would provide a strong impetus for resolving this.

Clearly, the Metro should carry the most passengers possible. It was designed to easily carry over 100,000 riders per day, but now carries barely half of that. The central light rail line should be second in the hierarchy.

Beyond that, how much service should be on traditional MTA bus routes and how much on circulators is an open question. But designating a "Circulator District" is a way of rationalizing the process to figuring it out. High density inner city areas work better with circulators, relative to spread out lower density outer city areas.

Then there is the question of who should operate the various services. Smaller and more localized services are more likely to be identiable with specific institutions such as colleges, hospitals or the Downtown Partnership. They have "skin in the game" and so may have a greater incentive to do a better or at least more personalized and tailored job of operating the service. They may also be able to run it less expensively, with lower wage rates, perhaps through contractors (although there is often contradictory talk about providing "living wages".)

It shouldn't necessarily be the city who runs the circulators, just as there is no magic formula for determining who should pay for it. The "Circulator District" should probably not be a formal tax authority "benefits" district.

Similarly, all services should be open to everyone. There should not be services targeted exclusively to tourists, college students, poor folks or any other specific group. That kind of marketing is what leads to inefficient redundancy.

The MTA has taken the first step, recognizing that they are not automatically the best at running these more localized routes. The next step is the creation of a "Circulator District".

Hogan's "Transformative Transitway"

Believe it or not, Governor Hogan's new bus plan actually has quite a bit in common with O'Malley's old dead Red Line light rail plan.

Setting aside the question of whether either of these transit plans actually makes sense, one must admit that as eye candy, Hogan's plan is pretty good. And since his predecessor Governor O'Malley sold his $3 billion Red Line plan almost exclusively on its hype value, one can't blame Hogan for also turning up the hype-meter a bit. But at a price tag of only $135 Million, it's much cheaper hype.

Hogan even copped one of the Red Line's key buzzwords - "transformative". So in looking for common ground between the two very disparate rival transit camps, finding a common element of "transformation" may be the way to do it.

Governor Hogan's new plan released yesterday for a "transitway" with spiffy new buses

Transitway?

And to back up his hype, Hogan's MTA came up with a truly eye-catching "money shot" of what his plan's"transitway" would look like. It's an extremely attractive view of West Baltimore Street looking east toward Howard Street, closed to all traffic except the MTA's new spiffy looking buses with a spiffy "Link" logo, and with a pedestrian median populated by respectable relaxed denizens. I had to study this quite a while before I could even figure out that this was indeed the west side of downtown Baltimore.

Ah, but it's hype, of course. This scene would more likely end up looking like Howard Street right around the corner. Howard Street's bus mall and subsequent light rail mall look extremely ratty and even more forlorn 40 years after first being closed to auto traffic. Transformative indeed.

Moreover, Howard Street still moves very slow. Traffic signal priority for transit, another part of the Hogan plan, has so far proven to be a false promise, perhaps because the conflicting cross streets have as much transit and as much need for right-of-way as the transit priority street.

Another quibble: The median pedestrian refuge shown in Governor Hogan's "transformative" drawing is of no use to folks waiting for buses. The buses have their doors on the right, whereas the median could only access the left side. But it does look nice. And of course, one could replace all the buses with fancy models with left side doors, or replace the buses with light rail.

Around the corner from Hogan's vision for a transformative transitway on Baltimore Street
 is this moribund scene of light rail on Howard Street

Transformative?

The heavy rebuttal from the Red Line partisans is that Hogan's plan isn't transformative enough. Buses don't create transformations. Only rail transit creates transformations.

There's enough evidence around the country to indicate there's some validity to that. But then there's Howard Street, where rail transit has been a monumental flop at achieving a transformation.

Like Howard Street, it is extremely unlikely that the "culture" of Baltimore Street can be successfully transformed simply by closing it off to traffic and replacing it with a pedestrian and/or transit mall.

But there's a better and more foolproof catalyst for creating transformation: A great development plan with great urban design. Let's face it: As much as Baltimore needs better transit (bus or rail), most urban redevelopment has happened here in spite of having lousy transit, in places like Canton, Harbor East and Harbor Point.

Hogan's first step to the Red Line

So where is the best place in Baltimore to put a transitway? Aha! It's the west Red Line corridor! In the middle of the grossly unnecessary "Highway to Nowhere". From there it can connect into downtown in the Saratoga Street corridor adjacent to the huge abandoned Metro West complex and the Lexington Market Metro Station.

But should it be rail or buses? The Red Line light rail would have gone only 18 mph, slower than express buses, so it really doesn't matter all that much, even with traffic signal priority which is common to both plans (and would work better out in a corridor than downtown).

The real solution is providing superior urban design to foster successful "transformation".

The MTA studied "Bus Rapid Transit" as part of its Red Line federally required "Alternatives Analysis" and their conclusion was that rail was better, but that was before the price of the rail plan ballooned into the stratosphere. Buses do have more flexibility, but both rail and buses have enough flexibility that intelligent planning and design are what is really more important.

OK, rail is more attractive than buses. Although it's not $3 billion better. But buses should be "good enough" if we can dazzle with urban design. Or on the other hand, rail can certainly be built far cheaper than $3 billion without the Red Line's staggeringly expensive downtown tunnel that would contribute nothing to the surface transformation.

MTA's $3 Billion Red Line Plan in the "Highway to Nowhere" (bottom)
and a far more "transformative" alternative (on top) which could be built for buses until the rail is ready.

Look at Marc Szarkowski's "transformation" of the MTA's dreary Harlem Park Red Line station in the bowels of the "Highway to Nowhere" (I keep returning to this - Marc taught me the term, "money shot"). Now just imagine it with buses instead of rail - at least, low or non-polluting buses.

And a bus transitway could easily be designed as the first step to building a light rail Red Line.

A New Beginning

The real appeal of the Red Line is not that it's rail. It's that it is a new beginning, which is what the US 40 West Red Line corridor really needs.

The key is that it would start over with a clean slate to create an urban design environment that really works.

First, focus on the redevelopment of the vast vacant Metro West complex at the downtown end of the "Highway to Nowhere", which currently has horrendously dysfunctional urban design. The transitway could slice through the site, providing a justification to demolish the goliath of a building between Mulberry and Saratoga Street, and extend the transit way to Saratoga Street and then to the Lexington Market Metro Station and Howard Street.

Transitway from the "Highway to Nowhere" (upper left), over MLK Blvd. on the existing bridge, then slashing thru the Metro West site to Saratoga Street (lower right)

By going directly through the Metro West site, it would allow the transitway to use one of the existing highway bridges to go over MLK Boulevard, and thus would strengthen the transitway as a gateway to all of northwest Baltimore. One of the MTA's cutting criticisms of turning the Red Line directly from MLK to Saratoga is that it would cause "wheel squeal". Hmmm... the only real squeal here was the MTA's desperate attempt to try to save their dead $3 billion Red Line plan.

At the west end of the highway, the Hogan plan calls for a transit hub at the West Baltimore MARC Station, another place with great urban design potential, with or without the Red Line. The previous Red Line plan instead put most of the bus transfers at the Rosemont Station precariously along Edmondson Avenue.

Then proceeding west, not much "transformative" has been done in any plan within the constrained right of way of Edmondson Avenue, but it widens out at the historic Edmondson Village Shopping Center. The new Uplands development provides a motif that can be extended into the transitway station and across the street into the shopping center.

Station environments are always critical. What happens between the stations is less so. If really great station environments can be created, it will matter less whether they serve buses or rail.

All of this can be done in an entirely incremental manner, one piece and parcel at a time, now with the existing bus route network, then with a newly revised network, or ultimately with light rail. Planning incrementally is almost always the key. Planning is a process, not an end result.

Perhaps the very first step is for the MTA to change it's new color-coded bus routes so that its west bus line is designated "Code Red".

Paul Simon exhibit turns Jonestown into Graceland

The Jewish Museum of Maryland has "reason to believe, we all will be received, in Graceland." The reason is their new Paul Simon exhibit, which as expressed in one of his most famous songs, hopes to attract "poorboys and pilgrims with families... going to Graceland" - part of the museum's effort to create a new recognition of its community and heritage.

A big guitar on the roof of the Jewish Museum of Maryland signifies the Paul Simon exhibit.
One of hundreds of units of new "socially engineered" housing is to the left.
Attman's Deli with its Kibbutz Room is in the right foreground. Numerous vacant lots remain.

The museum is located in Jonestown, a neighborhood which has experienced tumultuous changes amid ongoing identity crises since the Lloyd Street Synagogue first opened in 1845.

The Jewish community dispersed long ago for promised lands elsewhere. In the 1950s, there was little enough remaining from various population flows that the area was almost totally rebuilt for low income high-rise public housing "projects".

The failure of these low income housing "projects" was then reflected in the social upheavals of the 1960s, intertwined with a musical revolution led in part by Paul Simon (and another Jewish-American Bob Dylan).

Paul Simon was looking to find himself in another of his most famous songs, "America", and Jonestown has also been looking.

The "projects" were blown up in 2001. They have now faded into history along with the open fields along the New Jersey Turnpike, hitchhiking and smoking cigarettes on a bus, as Simon sang as he "looked for America".

Last moments of the Jonestown low income high rise "projects" as implosion begins.

The Jonestown high rise low income "projects" were replaced by social engineering of a different sort - rowhouses whose mix of residents' incomes were carefully calibrated in a very calculated attempt at social unity.

Jonestown is now a neighborhood of static unearthly calm where the old Lloyd Street Synagogue stands out from the new rowhouses. It's right next to Baltimore's celebrated Inner Harbor, but in some sense, it's an eternity away.

Jonestown is also a marked contrast to "Little Italy", the neighborhood just to the south, which has tenaciously held on to its ethnic identity and historic housing over the decades, surviving a period when flaunting "ethnic purity" (as President Carter once called it) precipitated widespread backlash.

Such cultural identity is now treated like a brand. The main thing now perceived as Italian in Little Italy is the restaurants. Jonestown culture is now also relegated to the far more visible Reginald F. Lewis Museum of Maryland African American History and Culture. It now seems unlikely any neighborhood will be renamed something like "Little Israel" or "Little Africa".

Social engineering, whether good or bad, is like a brain transplant. It makes it easier to compartmentalize memories of history and where the city's people have been. As of now, people don't live in Jonestown because of the museum, synagogue, corned beef emporiums, Shot Tower, the old house where the "Star Spangled Banner" flag was stitched, or other organic urban institutions holding on, but simply because they had the right income to fit the socially engineered demographic parameters.

Jonestown "projects" implosion in 2001, with the Jewish Museum of Maryland engulfed inside the cloud of smoke. 

When the Jews moved out and then again when the low income housing residents moved out, and the newly pre-qualified residents meeting the demographic standards moved in, they were like shifting ingredients of an ongoing social experiment.

The Maryland Jewish Museum is still looking for Jonestown, just as Paul Simon was looking for America, and the entire City of Baltimore continues trying to find itself after its recent tumultuous Freddie Gray "unrest" and its subsequent curfew, first mandated and then self-imposed.

The Graceland that Paul Simon longed for was not the one that tourist hucksters created after Elvis Presley died. The musical revolution started by Elvis and others in the 1950s, setting the stage for Paul Simon, was a product of complex and seemingly magical social currents that we still can only partially explain. There was nothing calculated about it.

So is the Jonestown calm real or contrived, temporary or permanent, static or dynamic? In a sense, the most "real" part of Jonestown is now the vacant lots, the missing pieces through which the course of the neighborhood is still to be defined, and for which there is still no economic justification or impetus for development, in marked contrast to the nearby waterfront building boom.

Paul Simon described the calm as "Peace Like a River":

Peace like a river ran through the city

Long past the midnight curfew
We sat starry-eyed
Oh, we were satisfied

And I remember
Misinformation followed us like a plague
Nobody knew from time to time
If the plans where changed
Oh, if the plans were changed

You can beat us with wires
You can beat us with chains
You can run out your rules
But you know you can’t outrun the history train
I‘ve seen a glorious day...

Four in the morning
I woke up from out of my dreams
Nowhere to go but back to sleep
But I’m reconciled
Oh, oh, oh, I’m gonna be up for a while...

CPHA Postmortem Report: "The Red Line: what now?"

The report on the recent September 15th Citizens Planning and Housing Association Red Line "Summit" asks that question. The simple unspoken answer is this: Build a west-only Red Line.

The forum's inconclusive deliberations can be summed up by a comment from Brian O'Malley, repeating the "all or nothing" mantra which has plagued the transit plan throughout its 15 year history (page 8):

"Brian O’Malley noted that the state spent $280 million on just planning for the Red Line, and it would not have made any sense to implement a parallel process as an alternative."

While it is shocking that the Maryland Transit Administration has already spent $280 Million (over a quarter of a billion !!!) on "just planning", without any shovels in the ground, it is also misleading. Although the lion's share of that astronomical sum went to study the Red Line, including a major portion of "final design", it also included the statewide planning process for the entire proposed rail transit system (including the Purple Line).

Any "parallel process" at any price would have been self-defeating. In planning, everything relates to everything else and must be analyzed together. Moreover, a comprehensive "Alternatives Analysis" was indeed a central element of the federally required transit planning process which the Red Line went through.

But since everything else was rejected at one stage or another, the proposed $3 Billion Red Line ultimately was forced to rise or fall on its own. As such, the Red Line became increasingly vulnerable as the years went on and on and on...

The basic mistake was that the MTA treated each of the various steps, starting with the 2002 regional rail plan, as a series of hoops to be jumped through. Their strategy was just to get through each hoop and don't look back.

Baltimore's rail planning history is recounted here from 1968-1998 and here from 1999-2015.

The simplest, best way to build the Red Line is to just replace its 3.4 mile downtown tunnel with a four-block leg
 on or partially under Saratoga Street, from MLK Boulevard into a Lexington Market Transit Hub,
which also serves the existing Green Line (Metro) and the Blue Line (Central Light Rail).

Each hoop was another iteration which changed the plan, but there was never any meaningful feedback to determine if the evolving plan still made sense in its overall context. Thus it became an "all or nothing" plan, which is how it has been characterized by both the Red Line's planning professionals and by its political leaders, both before and after it was cancelled by Governor Hogan and his Transportation Secretary Pete Rahn.

In effect, the MTA allowed the Red Line to design itself. They couldn't figure out how to run it without impacts through downtown, so that required a tunnel. They couldn't figure out how to tie it into the Metro, so that required a separate two-block long pedestrian tunnel (although its engineering was apparently postponed). They only found one tunnel portal location that would work at each end, on Boston Street and inside the "Highway to Nowhere", so that defined the tunnel. They couldn't cram the line into the middle of Boston Street or Edmondson Avenue, so that required reducing street traffic capacity by a third to a half, thus greatly increasing congestion and traffic spillover to other routes. They never did test the Red Line as part of any subsequent future system.

Another statement made by Brian O’Malley, Director of the Central Maryland Transportation Alliance (sounds like a relative of the previous governor who had supported the Red Line), was that "the Red Line was never meant to be a standalone project." (page 6)

But by killing the rest of the projects which would make up the system, first the Metro extension to Morgan State and the "Mini-MARC" rail project, then later the "BNIP" bus system plan which Governors O'Malley and Hogan both squelched, all due to perceived lack of feasibility, the Red Line became just that - a standalone project.

Meanwhile, the cost of the Red Line exploded from about $1 to $3 Billion, with no real evidence that the rise would stop there. Who would pay what share of this rising cost was very uncertain. The open-ended 10-percent local city and county share was shrouded in smoke and mirrors. The "Public-Private Partnership" (3P) was just a convoluted house of cards. Even the vaunted $900 Million federal share was illusory, as demonstrated by how a similar sum for the committed DC Purple Line seems to have vanished in the ongoing federal budget process.

In a real sense, the Red Line actually died to avoid its funding threat to the DC-suburban Purple Line, whose 3P and local funding shares seem to have at least some basis in reality. One multi-billion dollar rail transit project was clearly all the state could get, and clearly the Purple Line was better poised than the Baltimore Red Line.

Back to Square One?

This CPHA summit was essentially the fulfillment of the MTA's ongoing threat - which continued unabated under both the O'Malley and Hogan administrations - that their $3 Billion Red Line plan was "all or nothing" and the region was now forced to go back to Square One.

The MTA planners even went so far as to infer throughout their planning process that building only a piece of their Red Line plan was not even feasible. That assertion goes against every other rail plan the region ever had, other than the 2002 plan with the Red Line.

As if to demonstrate this, CPHA polled the participants of their preference for the next "Regional Scale Project" (page 11). Of the five options given to choose from, the only one which represented a remnant of the Red Line included the segment which had been specifically noted as being "fatally flawed" because it included the billion-plus dollar downtown tunnel - "West Baltimore MARC to Bayview MARC".

A vote either way on CPHA's poll confirmed this. Over 70% voted against that alternative in favor of something less expensive and more modest with buses and commuter rail, while the remaining group of less than 30% decided to vote for it anyway despite it already being continuously rejected throughout the decade long planning process.

In sum, nearly 30% wanted to save part of the Red Line, while the other 70% wanted something less expensive and more buildable. So let's give all 100% what they want.

The Simple Incremental Solution

Every regional transit plan since the 1960s has had a rail line in the US 40 West corridor. Virtually no one is against that in some form and no one has identified any fatal flaws to it. So here is the simple inexpensive Red Line solution:

1 - Build the Red Line as already planned and designed (with tweaks of course) west of the downtown tunnel for some distance, as determined by practical and economic factors. The rest of the west end to CMS/Woodlawn can be built later if so desired.

2 - Reinstate the previous MTA "Locally Preferred Alternative" plan to run the Red Line from the west tunnel portal location of the current plan (near the Mulberry/Fremont intersection) in a surface alignment to MLK Boulevard. This plan had only previously been eliminated because a tunnel portal on MLK Boulevard had engineering problems which emerged after it had already been approved.

3 - Develop a new plan for the short portion of the Red Line between MLK Boulevard into downtown. Three possible options are:

a - A short four-block connection along Saratoga Street from MLK Boulevard to Eutaw Street into a Lexington Market Metro Station Hub, which would include a two-block long "cut and cover" tunnel into the station's mezzanine (non-track) level.

b - A short five-block all-surface connection along Saratoga Street from MLK Boulevard to Howard Street, connecting into the existing light rail line, sharing its Lexington Market Station.

c - A slightly longer all-surface connection from MLK Boulevard to the Inner Harbor, terminating at Pier 6 next to Harbor East, with various options in a manner similar to the MTA's all-surface "Alternative 4A" in the Red Line's Draft Environmental Impact Statement.

A mostly surface plan has the advantage of future integration with a streetcar system which could include more than one connection into downtown and elsewhere, and far better connectivity to major downtown locations such as the University of Maryland campus and the now-vacant Social Security "Metro West" site which urgently needs a redevelopment plan. (See this 2013 Baltimore Brew article.)

Anyone totally against a light rail Red Line can focus on re-opening the planning for extending the Metro beyond Hopkins Hospital (which should never have been closed because it affects the Red Line), although the CPHA poll didn't recognize that option.

There is no reason whatsoever to start over at "Square One" on the Red Line, and the CPHA "Summit" certainly did not provide one.

Three Pilot Projects to Start Fixing Traffic/Transit

Better signal timing - new circulator bus lines - fixing traffic flow

Baltimore needs to learn to walk before it can run. Here's a simple step-by-step guide to getting started - one project each in north, south/west and east Baltimore, each located where it can most readily demonstrate the greatest improvements.

Instead of flailing from one overwrought, overhyped, chronically delayed transportation project to another, this city needs to start with the basics and then build from there. Each of these could be a step to fixing the entire city transportation network.

Step 1 - North Baltimore: Fix the traffic signal timing

The corridor from Mount Vernon to Charles Village is the best place for a pilot project to fix the timing of the traffic signal system because it is dominated by one-way streets, which are easier to time correctly than the two-way streets.

It's quite simple. Reduce the signal cycle time (combined red, green and yellow time) as much as possible, so that traffic does cannot see a long simultaneous swath of green lights proceeding from intersection to intersection that invite cars to try to race through as many as possible. This will also allow the time interval between when the lights change at adjacent intersections (called the offset) to be set to the optimum speed for the traffic. If two adjacent traffic signals turn green simultaneously, the signals are mathematically set for a speed of infinity, which is just what some motorists will attempt to do!

Cycle times of 60 seconds or less work in Philadelphia and Portland. They can work here too.

If two intersections are 370 feet apart, then to set the signal timing for 25 mph, the offset between when their signals turn to green and red should be set to 10 seconds - 37 feet per second or 25 miles per hour.

Minimizing cycle lengths also reduces delays, giving motorists less incentive to run the red lights and block intersections. It also reduces queueing. If a cycle is half as long, only half as many cars will stack up after the signal turns red.

Long signal times are often rationalized as being better for pedestrians. This is mostly wrong. Yes, flashing "Don't Walk" intervals should be a certain length in order to provide enough time to cross the street to avoid getting caught in the middle. But the law is that any pedestrian already caught in a crosswalk has the right-of-way regardless of the signal.

Moreover, it is the "Walk" signal time that varies depending on the cycle length, not the flashing "Don't Walk" time. Pedestrians don't need long "Walk" signal times. "Walk" is just the indication to get off the curb and start walking. Once you start walking, the "Walk" signal has done its job.

Much worse is a lengthy solid "Don't Walk" while the traffic and pedestrians on the conflicting street have the right of way. Lengthy solid "Don't Walk" signals are just an incentive for jaywalking.

In Philadelphia, they've actually been able to get rid of many pedestrian signals altogether because the traffic signal turning green/red is the only cue that pedestrians actually need. Yes, some streets in Philly are pretty narrow which makes pedestrian crossing easier. That can be duplicated by installing curb bump-outs, which would come after Step One.

Shorter signal cycles and slower traffic actually increase traffic capacity because they reduce intersection blockages and allow shorter safe distances between moving vehicles (fast traffic needs to spread out). Slow traffic is better for everyone, at least down to about 25 mph.

Instead of continually messing around with long-promised but never delivered two-way streets or complex "cycle tracks", Mount Vernon and Charles Village should first undergo a complete traffic signal system re-timing. That may change the entire outlook on traffic of motorists, pedestrians, cyclists and residents alike.

The #1 bus line is currently just another route segment among many between Mondawmin and Downtown.
It would be far more effective reinvented and optimized as a "Circulator".

Step 2 - South/West Baltimore: Split the #1 MTA bus line into circulators

The Maryland Transit Administration's #1 bus line starts at Sinai Hospital in northwest Baltimore, proceeds southward to the Mondawmin Metro transit hub, then meanders around West Baltimore into Downtown, then continues southward to Fort McHenry.

Nobody should actually want to take a trip like that. If you want to travel from Mondawmin to Downtown, you should take the Metro subway, which takes 7 minutes to Lexington Market. The #1 bus line takes about 25 minutes for the same trip (according to the schedule). Sure, there are some folks who have extra time and would prefer not to get off their bus and transfer to the Metro (or another bus). But vehicle operating time is critical to organizing a rational efficient transit system, and that's the whole purpose of the Mondawmin Metro hub. Time is money for the MTA.

Meanwhile, the city government decided to get into the transit business to run its own "circulators" because the MTA bus system just doesn't do a very good job of serving shorter trips.

The big basic problem is that the longer the route, the more opportunities there are for something to go wrong. And longer routes ought to be optimized for higher speed, relative to shorter trips. For example, a 100% difference between a 5 versus a 10 minute trip is not that big a deal, but the same proportional difference between a 30 and 60 minute trip is a much bigger deal - both for the rider and for the MTA.

Shorter bus lines can thus not only be more reliable, but also closer to the people. This can be used to cultivate local community pride and identity. Meanwhile, longer routes can be made faster by avoiding every stop, zig, zag, nook and cranny within local communities.

The #1 bus line is the perfect prototype for the MTA to begin optimizing its system for shorter and longer routes. It inefficiently meanders around, but it connects to the Mondawmin Metro hub, the system's best connection point, and it terminates at the end of a peninsula at Fort McHenry, so any possible further extension is not an issue.

Meanwhile, the cash-strapped city has been forced to cut back its "Banner Line" Circulator which serves Fort McHenry, putting the line into what former MTA head planner Henry Kay characterized as a "death spiral" - less frequent service means less riders which then calls for even more cutbacks which means even less riders and on and on.

Here's the solution: Split the MTA #1 bus line into three separate routes: (1) Sinai Hospital to Mondawmin, (2) Mondawmin to Downtown, and (3) Downtown to Fort McHenry.

The Fort McHenry leg would replace the "Banner Line" Circulator. The west leg would become a new circulator serving such neighborhoods as Franklin Square, Harlem Park and Sandtown. The Sinai leg would be a shuttle to and from the Metro. Each would be optimized and "branded" to serve the specific needs and identity of each community.

Each would also create opportunities for creative funding and operating agreements. The "Banner Line" had a special subsidy from the federal government to serve the Fort McHenry National Monument. Hospitals commonly fund and run their own shuttles, so Sinai could be invited to do the same. Transit lines run by outside private-sector contractors are a common arrangement, both for the MTA (on so-called "commuter" routes) and the city's Charm City Circulator.

Splitting the #1 line can be the prototype for restructuring the entire transit system to optimize routes by trip lengths, eliminate redundancies and better assign responsibilities for transit run by the MTA and other institutions such as the city, hospitals and colleges.

Step 3 - East Baltimore: Decide between one and two-way streets

Political perception and historical happenstance have mostly decided whether streets in Baltimore are one or two-way, not rational competent traffic analysis. Most people still complains about traffic.

North Baltimore has mostly one-ways. That provides the best opportunity to rationalize traffic signal timing, which should proceed first before any decisions are made to change traffic flow, which is a much more arduous process.

East Baltimore has mostly two-ways, some of which work fairly well because of ample use of left-turn and parking restrictions (Orleans and Fayette Street) and because Pratt and Lombard end at Patterson Park (they were converted between Broadway and the park a few years ago).

South Baltimore is similar in that Charles and Light Streets end abruptly to the south, although Light Street becomes so narrow that two-way flow causes problems.

West Baltimore is a very odd mixture, even on couplets. Pratt is one-way eastbound while its couplet Lombard is two-way. Fayette is one-way westbound while it couplet Baltimore Street is two-way. Washington Blvd. becomes one-way between MLK Boulevard and Russell Street.

The big focus should be on the east-west streets through Fells Point, which have the biggest traffic problems. but not until people are confident about the capabilities of traffic signal timing to meet their needs.

That is why the Step One pilot project (above) should be conducted first to optimize the traffic signal timing in the north corridor through Mount Vernon and Charles Village, before anything major is done in the southeast.

There are actually numerous real opportunities for improvement in Fells Point, despite feelings of helplessness and despite the city's lack of action on traffic as they have approved a huge amount of new traffic generating development.

The easiest measures to implement are left-turn prohibitions and short length parking restrictions at specific problem locations, to create "daylight" at intersections to accommodate various maneuvers related to turns.

This is what the city recently did in restricting parking along a short length of Aliceanna Street just west of Boston Street to accommodate a minor left-turn movement into a small parking lot. Whether it was worth the trouble is debatable, but it simply indicates it can be done.

Unfortunately after that, the city created mass confusion and disgust by secretly planning to remove the rest of the peak period parking along all of Aliceanna Street through Fells Point with no substantial justification. Councilman Kraft then said it was OK to keep it a secret because the city wasn't going to change its mind anyway, but after the secret came out, the city did just that.

Aliceanna Street traffic has been tamed through Harbor East (the highest density area in southeast Baltimore) by a traffic circle at its intersection with President Street. That encourages traffic to divert to Central Avenue and Fleet Street.

Much flexibility in resolving the question of one-way versus two-way flow is afforded by the fact that there are three successive east-west through streets - Aliceanna, Fleet and Eastern Avenue. Potentially, two of them could be converted to a one-way couplet and the third "downgraded" to a more localized orientation.

As per the precedent in Harbor East, it would seem that Aliceanna Street would be the best candidate for traffic de-emphasis. Moreover, Aliceanna ends at Boston Street, while Eastern and Fleet continue eastward.

Thus an Eastern-Fleet one-way pair could transition eastward (perhaps at Boston/Chester Street) into the current two-way pair, with unbalanced flow as has worked well on Pratt and Lombard near Patterson Park. A first small step toward this has already been done at the intersection of Eastern Avenue and Haven Street in Highlandtown, where the city installed left and right turn lanes to promote some diversion onto surrounding streets which has successfully reduced congestion.

Conclusion

Better signal timing is the most important factor and should be first. Many people have rightly resisted traffic changes because they don't have faith that the city can pull them off. But other high density cities have signal timing and one-way streets which work well, so Baltimore can too.

So a series of limited manageable pilot projects is the best course. First, optimize signal timing in north Baltimore. Work with the MTA to optimize the bus route structure in west and south Baltimore. Then fix the traffic flow in east Baltimore.

Six-Mile Greenway Loop would rebuild West Baltimore

Unify the communities by unifying their geography -

Southeast Baltimore has the waterfront... West Baltimore needs a comparable large, defining public space - a place that tells you where you are and makes you glad you're there. A place that confirms that West Baltimore is special and purposeful and tied together. It just so happens that a six-mile greenway loop is available to fill the bill - an ideal shape for such a space - for pedestrians, bikes, joggers, transit and a magnet for new development.

Martin Luther King Blvd. frontage has the right idea here: A greenway oriented to housing.
It just needs to be expanded into a real linear park.

But unfortunately, the latest Southwest Plan looks inward where it should look outward. It turns its back to the very spaces that should define it. The area of West Baltimore to the north, including Harlem Park and Sandtown, is just beginning an agonizing reappraisal in light of the recent unrest. It urgently needs a strong linkage toward the city beyond.

This six-mile loop would serve both the northwest and southwest. It would have it all in spectacular contrast - academia, funk, history, organized nature, wild nature, golf, Baltimore's two largest office buildings, other commercial sites and a postmodern urban world apart.

West Baltimore already has the raw material: Huge historic Carroll Park, attached to a golf course, both of which are now isolated from all the nearby neighborhoods to the north. It has a major downtown college campus - the University of Maryland - which is far less of a campus than it could be. It has the very natural and very historic Gwynns Falls Greenway, which again is very isolated.

West Baltimore also has two great rail transit corridors - one of which happens to be the oldest rail corridor in America at nearly 200 years old (The B&O Railroad). The other is so new that it hasn't even been developed yet, despite 50 years of trying (the "Highway to Nowhere").

Nearest to the northwest is Heritage Crossing, the beautiful neo-Olmstedian neighborhood built in the 1990s as a catalyst to rebuild its surroundings, at which it has failed, including the fine but crumbing Victorian architecture of Lafayette Square.

The problem here is that we have allowed borders to divide instead of unite us. But borders are actually the best place to put a defining space, because they can take advantage of unique geography while minimizing conflicts, while bringing both sides together. Making these spaces the focal point for development is essential. Borders cannot succeed in a vacuum.

Most of this six-mile loop is already in the city's bike plan and various park plans. It simply has not been thought out together in the context of the whole city.

Let's make this work, folks! West Baltimore has too much going for it to fail.


The West Baltimore Six-Mile Loop

Here's the greenway loop, in six color-keyed segments, starting to the east (right) at the downtown end and going clockwise:

Six-mile West Baltimore Greenway with six color-keyed segments

1 - Martin Luther King Boulevard - Purple - This major downtown bypass built in the early 1980s was originally supposed to be an expressway, and so it had many odd leftover parcels that are already lush and attractive (see top photo) but never really related to much. The boulevard can easily be shrunk by narrowing the median and eliminating some of the right turn lane space without adversely affecting traffic flow.

This leftover space can be consolidated on the west side to create a great linear park oriented to adjacent development parcels. This can also serve as a great campus space for the University of Maryland, which has been striving to link its downtown campus westward across MLK Boulevard to its biotech park.

Read more about this in a 2014 article in the BaltimoreBrew.

2 - Pigtown Gateway - Orange - Between Pratt Street and Washington Boulevard, the loop would turn westward into the community to the B&O Railroad Museum. Besides those two streets, which carry more traffic, Ramsay and McHenry Streets in between would also be candidates for the loop, as would any two, three or all four.

Pigtown's recent plan identifies this area as a business district gateway to lure new customers from downtown and MLK Boulevard through traffic. This portion of the loop has the particular advantage of being the most affluent, including Barre Circle and Camden Crossing, which establishes the desired more upscale image to set the tone for business.

This type of association has often been the key to upgrading city neighborhood business districts, notably in Hampden, Federal Hill, Canton, Lauraville, Charles Village and Mount Vernon, while retaining their "funky" characters.

Large planters have been put in the middle of Ramsay Street to prevent through traffic, which is ideal for bikes and pedestrians.

3 - B&O Railroad "First Mile" - Royal Blue - The B&O Railroad Museum, terminus of the first mile of American railroading, is a truly world-class institution and historic treasure. Unfortunately, the track area has been allowed to become a dangerous urban "no man's land", officially off-limits but still an extremely important space at the north edge of lovely large Carroll Park overseen by the city's oldest and most significant mansion.

These tracks have had several lifetimes, from the original narrow-gauge "Tom Thumb" to the city's first major passenger terminal to a major railroad maintenance yard and then a short tourist ride. Now this corridor must be redefined once again to serve the communities. Urban parks such as Carroll Park need urban edges to draw people in and create a viable constituency. (This plan was first presented in this February 2014 BaltimoreBrew story.)

Carroll Park North Edge - "First Mile" schematic concept by Marc Szarkowski

Here is the concept (illustrated above and below). Just north of Carroll Park (starting from the left), a parkfront address would be established for new urban development along a public street, which could be named "First Mile Avenue". Next to that would be the railroad tracks, suitable for museum trains and/or streetcars (possibly serving a new streetcar museum) and echoing the corridor's historic roots. The streetcar line could even be branched-off a downsized Red Line.

Next to that would be the bike/pedestrian greenway trail. Finally on the south edge of the corridor would be steps down to enter the north edge of Carroll Park.

View of the iconic B&O Museum roundhouse would provide a memorable focal point
 for the east end of the "First Mile" corridor. (by Marc Szarkowski)

The west end of this corridor is anchored by the city's largest office building, Montgomery Park, as well as the Carroll Park Golf Course. The golf course is blocked by active CSX railroad tracks, which in 1907 the Olmsted Brothers recommended be linked with a short tunnel (before the golf course was built).

Proposed Carroll Park Clubhouse could link the golf course to the rest of the park and anchor the greenway, with an entryway under the active CSX railroad track. (Marc Szarkowski)

Such an Olmsted railroad underpass could be incorporated into a new golf clubhouse on the isolated park fragment north of Montgomery Park along Monroe Street, creating a memorable complimentary anchor to the B&O Roundhouse at the other end of the "First Mile" (illustrated above).

The golf course could be reoriented to this site and, for the first time, actually feel like a true urban golf course and an integral part of Carroll Park instead of just being a separate place off of the Interstate 95/Washington Boulevard 95 interchange. Imagine downtown workers catching a streetcar to play nine holes after a short day at the office.

Between the north edge of the golf course and the CSX tracks, the greenway would traverse one of the most beautiful, bucolic and obscure areas in all of Baltimore. Except for the litter, it's hard to believe the area in the photo below is practically right next to the Carrollton Ridge neighborhood.

Hidden area between Carroll Park Golf Course and Southwest communities with a lake and a mostly unused dead-end trail branch 

4- Gwynns Falls Trail - Green - Westward from the golf course, the loop would join the existing trail near its most memorable point where it goes under the Carrollton Viaduct, America's oldest railroad bridge (photo below). This beautiful trail continues up to Baltimore Street, at which point the existing path continues northwestward to Leakin Park, historic Dickeyville and into Baltimore County, while the new West Baltimore loop would veer off back to the northeast.

Carrollton Viaduct - America's oldest railroad  bridge - from the trail

5 - Amtrak Trail - Red - The greenway would then proceed from Baltimore Street near the Gwynns Falls along the Amtrak right of way and adjacent miscellaneous industrial parcels. Amtrak, the state and Federal Railroad Administrations are currently studying a billion-plus dollar upgrade to the Amtrak line. The study is focused primarily on replacing the tunnel toward Penn Station, but it could have a major impact on this area was well. The MARC station at Franklin/Mulberry is also in great need of replacement, and sites in this area could be selected because they are on straight track, which is a requirement for stations. This trail, which is included in the city's bike plan, could be built as an early phase in what could eventually be a huge project.

6 - Franklin/Mulberry "Highway to Nowhere" - Light Blue - The final segment of this clockwise loop six-mile tour is the only one not currently included in the city's bike plan, but its significance would far transcend that of just bikes. (Instead the city has proposed a small four-block bike/jogging loop along the top rim of the highway's walls and bridges east of Fulton Avenue, a project of very limited use.)

The largest issue is whether the "Highway to Nowhere" should be eliminated to enhance redevelopment, of which the greenway loop would be an integral part. Recently, the highway has been closed numerous times in one or both directions for various reasons, even simultaneously with the closure of the Frederick Avenue bridge, with no significant ill-effects. The city was also willing to reduce the peak through capacity of US 40 by 50-percent (3 to 2 lanes) to squeeze in the Red Line, which was acknowledged to cause far greater congestion and traffic diversion impacts.

Eliminating the "Highway to Nowhere" to create a new redevelopment corridor would have a far better impact than even building the $3 billion-plus Red Line (although they don't preclude each other at all). This would be a unique new urban geographic feature, free of traffic conflicts, with tremendous possibilities comparable (but not at all similar) to the potential which was unleashed when the portion of the proposed expressway system was cancelled along the southeast waterfront in the 1980s.

Proposed Harlem Park Red Line Station with elimination of the "Highway to Nowhere".
(MTA rendering modified by Marc Szarkowski)

The greenway loop would be the element which most orients the new development corridor to the energy of the rest of the city, especially downtown. In the rendering above, the greenway is the frontage along the lower level of the buildings along Mulberry Street (to the left), off limits to auto traffic. The buildings along the roadway to the right would accommodate larger-scale uses for which auto access is desirable along both the lower level (street shown) and upper level (Franklin Street).

This rendering was adapted from the MTA's depiction of the Harlem Park Red Line Station isolated in the highway median strip. Considering the Baltimore region's abysmal track record on "transit oriented development", this is a far more effective plan than the MTA and city's concept which retains the depressive highway. (See blog post.)


Full-Circle to Downtown

That brings us full-circle along the greenway loop to the interchange of the "Highway to Nowhere" and Martin Luther King Boulevard. This is where the Social Security Administration recently abandoned the city's second largest office building. (Yes, along with Montgomery Park, this greenway would serve both of the city's largest office buildings at its opposite ends.)

It is crucial to the future of the entire city that this massive office complex be redeveloped, and yet the current highway configuration (going directly underneath) makes this extremely difficult. Getting rid of the interstate highway remnant is the best course for creating a viable redevelopment site, and adding the greenway loop would make it even better.

Furthermore, this site is the best opportunity for all of west and southwest Baltimore to feed off the energy of downtown. While until now, MLK Boulevard and the "Highway to Nowhere" have divided these areas from downtown and each other, here is the opportunity to tear down the barriers and create real unity.


Special credit to Marc Szarkowski for the great graphics, and the intelligence behind them!

Red Line Obituary 1999-2015: So What Happens Next?

The decision of where a west transit line would be built, if anywhere, was made nearly a half century ago in 1967, when a 1.5 mile swath of West Baltimore was condemned and quickly destroyed for what is now the "Highway to Nowhere", with the median reserved for transit. A rail system plan was completed one year later in 1968, following the "hub and spoke" model used for virtually all modern rail transit systems.

The previous post chronicled the history up to 1999, at which time the present regional rail system was already in place (except for some light rail double tracking).

Now comes the history of the birth, life and death of the Red Line, from 1999 to the present...

In 1999, a new 20-year statewide transit plan was completed with a clear and do-able future financial framework for the west line.

But then only one year later in 2000, that plan was cast aside for a financially unsupported multi-billion dollar pipe-dream that is the current Baltimore Region Rail Plan, which was the birth of the now-defunct Red Line and many miles of even more unattainable and infeasible rail transit.

Now in 2015, we need to look back at 1999 in order to salvage the dead-end planning which has taken place since then that has led to the current stalemate.


1999 Transit Plan

The 1999 plan's recommendation was that overall transit funding should be increased by 40% (it has actually increased far more than that), but funding specifically for "capital expansion" should be decreased by 30% from previous levels, in order to emphasize improving the operation of the existing facilities and services. The study concluded that doing this would nearly double transit ridership by 2020 (only four years and four months to go!)

Three alternative capital projects were defined for the Baltimore area: (1) A west line from Downtown to Security/Woodlawn, (2) A downtown light rail loop which would extend the existing Howard Street-to-Penn Station line around the east side of downtown via the Jones Falls corridor, then back again via Pratt Street, and (3) A Metro extension from Hopkins Hospital toward White Marsh.

Soon thereafter, the MTA and the City concluded that the light rail loop should be built first, since this would best fulfill the downtown distribution and circulation functions for all the rail lines and the system as a whole.

But almost as quickly, they realized such a surface loop would be too slow and circuitous to serve these functions. The Citizens Planning and Housing Association then organized a campaign called "Northeast Now" to make the Metro extension beyond Hopkins the top priority.

But instead, only a year later, the powers-that-be decided to scuttle this three project wish-list with its de-emphasis on capital projects, and go back to the drawing board to create an entirely new comprehensive regional rail system plan. The resultant multi-billion dollar capital plan was a major departure from the 1999 plan.

2002 Plan and the Birth of the Red Line

Thus in 2000-2002, the Red Line was born. After over three decades, it was the first working rail plan to abandon the unified downtown hub concept. Instead it called for the west rail line to continue eastward through downtown in its own right-of-way, rather than being built as a west-only project.

This 2002 plan ambitiously called for the Red Line to be built from its west end eastward through downtown to Fells Point, while simultaneously building two other high priority rail projects: a Metro (Green Line) extension from Hopkins Hospital to Morgan State University, and a "Mini-MARC" (Purple Line) with five new stations providing local service eastward from Broadway (just north of Johns Hopkins Hospital) to Middle River (the existing Martin Airport MARC Station). The initial cost estimate for all three projects combined was $2.5 Billion.

But the latter two projects (other than the Red Line) were later apparently found to be infeasible. The Mini-MARC line was quietly abandoned, perhaps because Amtrak owns the tracks and surely would not want to see their New York-to-Washington service further bogged down by five new station stops in this highly bottlenecked corridor.

The Metro extension to Morgan began the same full-blown federal funding planning process as the Red Line, but its early cost effectiveness scores were so terrible that the study was abruptly cancelled.

With those "high priority" projects cancelled, the rest of the 2002 plan essentially was dead as well. Red Line supporters had to change their mantra from the being part of a complete system to being the single critical project that would save the Baltimore rail transit system.

Thus the Red Line became "all or nothing".


The Red Line Goes It Alone (2003-2015)

The next realization was that Fells Point was not an appropriate east terminal point for the Red Line. This opened a new debate because the original ultimate plan had two termini, one branching southward to the Canton waterfront and the other swinging northward to Bayview, then further southward to Dundalk/Turner's Station.

The initial idea to resolve this was to combine both alignments into a surface loop that would take the south route from Fells Point via Boston Street through Canton, then northward on Conkling Street to Highlandtown, then back to Fells Point. This was rejected.

The final resolution was a big zig-zag. The line would follow the south alignment via Boston Street, then swoop all the way north to Bayview and then south again to Dundalk/Turner's Station. But then, the Bayview to Dundalk leg was left off the "priority project" (probably forever, since it would be so slow and circuitous).

In this early stage leading to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, there was surprisingly little controversy. Most people were united in wanting maximum tunneling to minimize impacts and traffic conflicts. But gradually, the Canton (east side) and Edmondson Village (west side) communities realized the cost pressures meant they wouldn't get their respective tunnels under Boston Street and Edmondson Avenue.

And the MTA didn't want to play favorites. Even the west-side Cooks Lane tunnel was kept to a single reversible track in the initial "Locally Preferred Alternative" to keep the total project cost well under $2 Billion, which was considered a major price-point threshold.

The LPA plan also included a total revision of the ridership data that had previously been used to compare and reject all the other alternatives. Projected daily ridership was thus suddenly increased from 40,000 to 60,000, making the LPA plan look very much more cost-effective than before. (Since then, various adjustments have been made to bring the number back down to 47,000.)

Transit advocates were uniformly critical of a single track Cooks Lane tunnel, citing the reliability and delay problems suffered by the existing light rail line when it was originally built with large single track segments. Add to that the safety threat of running a reversible track in a tunnel with a sharp blind curve.

The MTA never retracted their contention that a single track tunnel would be just as safe and viable as a two track tunnel, but they abandoned their one-track design anyway while allowing the cost estimate to go over $2 Billion.

However, the MTA stood firm on no tunnels through Canton and Edmondson Village. East-side Cantonites continued to protest, but west-siders largely became resigned to a surface Red Line squeezed onto Edmondson Avenue.

Next, the MTA discovered they needed to extend the downtown tunnel under Fremont Avenue because of engineering problems, to which the community filed a lawsuit.

Then leading developer John Paterakis forced the MTA to move the Harbor East Station away from Central Avenue, the major north-south spine into the huge Harbor Point complex. This required the redesign of the entire tunnel under the Inner Harbor.


You Only Die Once?

As a result of all this and ensuing delays, the Red Line's cost estimate climbed to mere dollars away from $3 Billion, another major psychological price-point. This price tag was certain to rise even more because of further delays (even before Hogan was elected Governor), and the fact that the various project responsibilities and cash flows had never been fully itemized. For example, the hoped-for $900 Million federal funding was programmed in only $100 Million annual increments, which doesn't add up for a six-year project with very heavily front-loaded costs for expensive tunneling.

In addition, the 10% local share pledged mostly from the city government included many costs that were not in the totals. Most uncertain of all, the public-private partnership would have been extremely complex and was fraught with mystery.

All this made it impossible for the MTA to prepare the most important document to make the Red Line a real project - the Full Funding Grant Agreement.

Pete Rahn no doubt learned far more than all this during the brief time he had been Governor Hogan's Transportation Secretary in early 2015. Originally, he said he intended to make a decision on the DC suburban Purple Line prior to studying the Red Line.

But the Red Line apparently looked so bad to him that he didn't see the point in waiting to kill it, and the process which he used to save the Purple Line would clearly not work for the Red Line. The city's cost share was already "smoke and mirrors" and Baltimore County had already balked at contributing real money. The only major cost that could clearly be cut was the two block long pedestrian tunnel to the Metro. The Purple Line's private sector partner would clearly have top responsibility for design, construction and operation, unlike the convoluted web slowly being woven for the Red Line.

When Mr. Rahn cited the Red Line's 3.4 mile downtown tunnel as its "fatal flaw", it made the point that cost problems alone were sufficient to kill the project in the absence of a Plan B, since this tunnel alone comprised approximately half of the total construction cost.


Red Line Autopsy

In 1999, Governor Glendening presided over an incremental plan that created a sound financial basis for transit growth, but then almost immediately the hype-meisters pushed that strategy aside in favor of the indulgent 2002 comprehensive regional rail plan. Since then, the Red Line has been dieing a slow death.

Governor Ehrlich's administration saw problems, but tried to fix them by simply promoting bus rapid transit instead of rail, not by addressing the structure of the system. Then the O'Malley administration doubled and tripled-down on the Red Line, even while overseeing eight more years of chronic delays.

The downtown tunnel was the immediate cause of death, but the 2002 plan was the underlying cause. The Red Line's fatally flawed tunnel existed due to the 2002 decision to build an east-west line separated from the rest of the rail system. The other rail lines in the 2002 plan proved not to be feasible, leaving the Red Line with no Plan B.

Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake was particularly confounded by this. She had steadfastly bought into the "once in a generation... all-or-nothing" hype, but then when the Hogan administration killed the project, she vowed that her staff would formulate and negotiate alternatives. This led to a "working session" with the state in August, at which time she and the other Red Line supporters reneged on her offer of alternatives and instead merely volleyed the challenge back into the state's court.

The years of preaching "No Plan B" thus backfired,


The Red Line is Dead - Long Live the Red Line

The Red Line's problems are clearly fixable: As MDOT Secretary Pete Rahn said, the downtown tunnel was the Red Line's fatal flaw. So just get rid of the fatal flaw.

The work of the past 15 years can be salvaged by building a west-only Red Line as it was planned from the 1960s onward to 1999, with additional linkages to the rest of the system that comprise Plans B, C, D and onward until Baltimore has a rail transit system that actually works.

Governor Mandel's Rail Transit Legacy

Governor Marvin Mandel, who died yesterday at the age of 95, was in many ways the father of Baltimore's rail transit system.

When he became governor in 1969, Baltimore's transit system was still being run by a private company teetering on bankruptcy. Governor Mandel presided over the state's takeover of the bus system to create the Mass (now Maryland) Transit Administration. The creation of the MTA was highly intertwined with the movement to build a rail system for the Baltimore region.

1968 Baltimore Region Rail Plan - all "heavy rail"

In the previous year, 1968, a full six leg heavy-rail Metro system plan was adopted by the Regional Planning Council (now the Baltimore Metropolitan Council which is the "MPO" for meeting fed regs), with all legs emanating from a central hub at Charles Center. The two top priority projects were declared to be the northwest and south legs.

Many people thought this was a pipe dream, considering not only the expected formidable fiscal and political difficulties, but also the reality that there wasn't even a public entity that was remotely capable of building such a system. There had been idle talk of building a rail system for at least 50 years.

But despite similar controversy and skepticism to what recently killed the Red Line, Governor Mandel actually figured out how to get the system funded and under construction.

Mandel recognized that political support for a south rail line in Anne Arundel County was weak and that the cost of building a multi-line heavy rail transfer station that crisscrossed downtown underneath Charles Center would be extremely high. So he killed the south line and focused solely on building the 14-mile northwest line to Owings Mills, with an 8-mile interim phase to Reisterstown Plaza.

The final agreement to get this project moving was that the second line would be to the north rather than the south. It would also be a far less expensive light rail line along the Jones Falls valley rather than heavy rail through Towson which was an extension of the south line in the previous plan,

Thus Governor Mandel used his pragmatic political skill to get the Metro built, in contrast to the recent strident futility of the MTA and city's Red Line all-or-nothing "No Plan B" 15-year process.

Meanwhile, the eventual corridor of a west rail line was cemented in place by the construction of 1.5 miles of Interstate 70 (US 40) between Franklin and Mulberry Streets, with its median reserved for future transit. After that, however, the west line took a back seat, and all that was ever built is what is now known as the "Highway to Nowhere".

Also in the latter 1970s, the heavy rail west line plan, which would have branched off from the northwest Metro just north of the Lexington Market Station, was replaced with light rail. The concept was to tie the incompatible heavy and light rail lines together through an elevated "downtown people mover" system not unlike what was built to serve the Metro in Miami. The people mover would meet the Metro at Lexington Market. It would then travel eastward and meet the north light rail line at the south end of the Jones Falls valley, at Guilford Avenue and East Saratoga Street.

In the 1980s, the people mover plan died a slow death. The north light rail line plan was moved from the Jones Falls westward to Howard Street through downtown and linked to a south light rail line. Both were quickly built under the impetus of the 1992 opening of Oriole Park at Camden Yards. The Metro was then extended slightly eastward to Hopkins Hospital.

The plan throughout the '90s was to link the eventual west line to the north-south light rail lines at Howard Street.

All of this was the ultimate result of Governor Mandel's 1970s push to get the northwest heavy rail Metro built, cancelling the south Metro line and then shifting the focus to light rail.

The main constant has been that every regional rail transit plan formulated for over the past half century since the 1960s has had a west line in the US 40 Franklin-Mulberry corridor, which remains in limbo with the recent cancellation of the Red Line.

Story to be continued...